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Abstract
Psychologists have long speculated that the research literature is largely dominated by positive findings, but yet there is little data to justify
these speculations. The present study investigates the extent to which negative findings exist in the literature by reviewing articles published
in five European psychology journals. While no temporal change was observed, the results indicate that almost all (95.4%) articles published
in 2001, 2006 and 2011 found support for at least one tested hypothesis. Moreover, a sizable number (73%) of papers found support for all
tested hypotheses. It is argued that the lack of negative findings can have a detrimental effect on the ability to systemize scientific knowledge,
the way science is practiced, and the rate of replications in psychology. Publishing positive findings may be very important for making progress
in our field, but negative findings are also crucial for maintaining its scientific integrity. When we base our conclusions on results that support
our predictions and ignore data to the contrary, we run the risk of creating a biased view of reality that gives us little confidence in the validity
and applicability of our findings.
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There has been a growing concern that publication decisions in scientific journals largely depend on the study
outcomes. Positive results that report significant outcomes and confirm the researcher’s expectations are more
likely to be published and have higher odds of being fully reported (Dwan et al., 2008). Negative results, on the
other hand, are often difficult to publish as they fail to reach the conventional significance levels and do not support
the tested hypotheses. As a result of this, journals are filled with positive findings, while negative results are largely
inaccessible to the scientific community.
Concerns with this practice are not new (e.g., McNemar, 1960; Smith, 1956; Tullock, 1959) and have sporadically
occupied psychologists for decades. Yet, besides the fact that negative results are important for designing better
systematic reviews and meta-analyses, few other arguments are given as to why negative results are important
in psychology.
The present article revisits the problem in two ways. First, it investigates empirically the extent to which negative
results exist in the literature by examining articles published in five European psychology journals. Second, it
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discusses how the general lack of negative results contributes to other problems that empirical psychology faces
today (e.g., see Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012).
Meta-Analysis: Problems With the Lack of Negative Results
Publishing positive findings that support the tested hypotheses is important for the advancement of scientific
knowledge. However, different problems can arise when the literature is dominated by a disproportionate amount
of positive results. First of all, this can be a potentially major threat to systematic reviews and meta-analyses
(Bradley & Gupta, 1997; Egger & Smith, 1998; Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005b; Thornton & Lee, 2000;
Torgerson, 2006; although see Dalton, Aguinis, Dalton, Bosco, & Pierce, 2012).
Meta-analytic studies can be used to shed light on important practical and empirical questions, but the confidence
that we have in their results depends on the extent to which they are free from bias (Banks, Kepes, & Banks,
2012). If studies reporting positive results are more likely to be published, they will also be easier to obtain compared
to negative and unpublished ones (Torgerson, 2006). This could potentially bias any attempts to do a systematic
review or to derive valid estimates by pooling data from multiple studies (Thornton & Lee, 2000). Also, because
published studies may systematically differ from unpublished ones, meta-analysis based only on published data
may reach misleading conclusions. This holds major practical implications because meta-analysis aggregates
data from many studies and is thus a good reference source for practitioners, policy makers and the general
public.
The consequences of ignoring negative studies, however, are not only constrained to the meta-analysis at hand
and the validity of its conclusions. When a meta-analysis that ignores relevant negative studies is published, and
the conclusions are later found to be misleading or incorrect, the perception is fostered that meta-analysis cannot
be trusted (Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005a). Another problem with a misleading meta-analysis is that it
slows scientific progress and it may give us the false illusion that conclusions are supported by data from multiple
studies when, in fact, they are biased or overstated due the excessive number of positive results. These con-
sequences probably don’t happen often, but when they do, they can have lasting effects on the field.
Although different methods for overcoming this bias have been proposed (see below), Thornton and Lee (2000)
argue that the best way to eliminate its effects on meta-analysis is to stop it from happening in the first place. For
this reason, negative studies play an important role in systemizing scientific knowledge and the trust that we have
in the validity of our conclusions.
The Pressure to Publish Positive Results
A second problem with the excessive amount of positive results in the literature is that they can influence research
decisions. Because negative results are often difficult to publish, this can indirectly encourage questionable research
practices that are aimed at obtaining publishable results (Nosek et al., 2012). In the publish-or-perish world of
academia, publishing as many papers as possible is essential for one’s career. Yet, researchers eventually find
themselves in a situation in which they fail to obtain results that reach the conventional significance level (p <
0.05). Such a situation can be tempting in itself and encourage research decisions that vary in their degree of
scientific misconduct but that are ultimately aimed at getting one’s results published (e.g., see Neuroskeptic,
2012).
The prevalence of questionable research practices was aptly demonstrated by a recent survey of over 2 000
psychologists (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012). It measured the extent to which they engage in ten such
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practices that range from milder ones (e.g., not reporting all conditions or dependent variables) to more severe
ones, such as falsifying data or deciding to exclude data after looking at their effect on the results. The survey
revealed that 94% of them admitted to having engaged in at least one questionable research practice. Moreover,
66% of the surveyed researchers admitted that they have failed to report all dependent variables and 58% admitted
that they have checked for significant results before deciding whether to collect more data.
The results from this survey are also in line with recent studies that have shown how “unacceptably” easy it can
be to obtain and report positive results (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Because psychologists normally
have great flexibility during the process of data collection and analysis, the rate of discovering false positive results
is inflated and researchers can easily accumulate significant findings that they can later report. Thus, it can be
argued that the pressure to come up with positive findings stimulates questionable research practices among
psychologists.
Negative Results and Replications
The lack of negative results in the literature is also closely related to another problem in empirical psychology –
the low rate of replications (Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). The lack of replic-
ations of research findings is a concern in many other scientific disciplines (Ioannidis, 2005), but the situation in
psychology seems to be further complicated by the high prevalence of positive results. Currently, psychologists
have little to gain from doing replications, but they do even less so if they cannot publish unsuccessful replications
due to the lack of significant results. А single failed replication is often difficult to publish (Aldhous, 2011), and
peer-reviewed journals are likely to accept failed replications only after a few attempts have been made. In this
sense, the bias against negative findings is actually hindering replication studies because failed replications аre
often denied publication.
The problem with unpublished failed replications can be viewed in at least two ways. First, on a more pragmatic
level, when an effect fails to be replicated, scientists from other labs may be largely unaware of this, especially if
the study is a conceptual replication (see Pashler & Harris, 2012). For example, if there are a few unsuccessful
attempts to replicate an effect, but nobody knows about them because they were not published, researchers from
other labs may also go on to pursue effects that don’t exist. This could potentially lead to wasted research funds,
time and resources that could be used to pursue other avenues (Knight, 2003).
Second, unpublished replications may also have wider implications for the field. Currently, replications in psychology
are very rare (about 1% of all publications; Makel et al., 2012), and it could be speculated that a large number of
replications that are actually carried out are never published. Unsuccessful replications may be difficult to publish,
but successful ones may ironically share the same fate, as some journals reject them on the grounds that they
do not contribute anything new beyond what is already known (Spellman, 2012). This further exacerbates the
problem because incorrect results from previous studies, however well-intentioned, remain unchallenged. If rep-
lications (successful or not) and negative studies are hard to publish, then this leads to a situation in which psy-
chological theories are not rigorously evaluated and may even become unfalsifiable (Ferguson & Heene, 2012).
For this reason, replications and negative studies have implications that are not restricted to the respective field
of research, but that are also important for maintaining the scientific integrity of psychology.
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Prevalence of Negative Results: Previous Studies
Considering the fact that these issues hold major implications for psychology as a science, it is important to know
how prevalent negative studies are. At present, however, not much is known about the extent to which they exist
in the literature. The main reason for this is that the studies that have investigated the problem are few and far in
between (Bozarth & Roberts, 1972; Spence & Blanchard, 2001; Sterling, 1959; Sterling, Rosenbaum, &Weinkam,
1995).
Sterling (1959) was first to systematically analyze articles published in four psychology journals. He found that
97.2% of all articles using significance tests rejected the main stated null hypothesis. Three decades later, Sterling
et al. (1995) reviewed eight psychological journals using the same criteria and concluded that publication practices
have not changed over the past 30 years. These results were also confirmed by Bozarth and Roberts (1972), who
found that 94% of articles published in three psychology journals rejected the null hypothesis. More recently,
Spence and Blanchard (2001) did a cross-sectional analysis of five journals in sport and exercise psychology that
spans over 10 years and found that 97.5% of all articles using significance tests rejected at least one null hypo-
thesis and that 80.1% rejected the main stated null hypothesis.
The Present Study
Most of these studies were conducted decades ago and this would imply that the problem has since been forgotten.
However, in recent years there has been a mounting interest in the lack of negative results and replicability of
psychological research both among professionals and European psychology students (Flis, 2012, January 1;
Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). This calls for a more thorough investigation of the problem, which will allow
psychologists to determine the extent to which negative findings are published in the literature. Such an estimate
is important because the information can be used to inform future meta-analytic studies and systematic reviews.
Traditionally, efforts to detect and correct for excessive positive findings have been done in meta-analytic studies
within the framework of publication bias – defined as the tendency of scientific journals to preferentially publish
papers that report significant results (Pautasso, 2010; Rosenthal, 1979). Nowadays, the majority of published
meta-analytic studies in psychology make some efforts to analyze for publication bias (Ferguson & Brannick,
2012) and authors are routinely advised to take it into account when doing a meta-analysis (e.g., see Field & Gillett,
2010). There are several statistical methods that are normally used to control for publication bias: Failsafe N,
Funnel plot, Trim and Fill, correlation and regression-based methods, and selection models (Kepes, Banks,
McDaniel, & Whetzel, 2012). However, these methods are not without their limitations and the wisdom of their
use lies with the researchers. For example, funnel plots, which are often used to detect publication bias, can be
distorted by heterogeneity across studies or by the number of studies included in the plot (Daya, 2006; Lau,
Ioannidis, Terrin, Schmid, & Olkin, 2006).
Because these methods are more suitable for controlling for publication bias when doing a meta-analysis, they
were not used in the present study. The aim of this study was to estimate the proportion of positive and negative
results in European psychology journals, as this is more closely related to the problems discussed in this paper.
This was done by reviewing published articles and coding for whether the tested hypotheses are supported or
not supported by evidence. While the current method estimates the prevalence of positive results, it does not in
itself demonstrate evidence for publication bias, as no excepted percentage of positive studies exists (Thornton
& Lee, 2000). Therefore, the results will only be discussed in terms of hypotheses that are supported or not sup-
ported by evidence.
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The present study utilized a design that is similar to Spence and Blanchard‘s (2001), Sterling’s (1959), and Sterling
et al.’s (1995) studies. However, in contrast to them, articles were not coded according to whether a particular
null hypothesis was accepted or rejected, but according to whether all tested research hypotheses are supported
or not supported by evidence. This approach provides wealthier data about published articles and avoids certain
technical problems associated with coding articles in terms of accepted or rejected null hypotheses (e.g., some
research hypotheses are tested with multiple significance tests).
Method
Data
All research articles from 2001, 2006 and 2011 were downloaded from the following five journals: European
Journal of Psychology of Education, European Journal of Social Psychology, Scandinavian Journal of Psychology,
British Journal of Clinical Psychology and British Journal of Developmental Psychology. The main inclusion criteria
were that journals had to: 1) be intended as an outlet for European psychologists 2) publish at least 4 issues per
year and 3) have a publication record that goes back to at least 2000.
From all eligible journals, the present five were chosen so that they represent geographically diverse areas and
serve as research outlets of different fields in psychology. Furthermore, preference was given to journals that
publish more research articles. The first two journals were selected because they meet the criteria of representing
different fields and European psychologists at the same time. The Scandinavian Journal of Psychology was chosen
because it publishes papers in all areas of psychology and is intended as an outlet for psychologists from
Scandinavia. The last two journals were selected in order to acknowledge the fact that the majority of European
English-speaking journals are based in the United Kingdom; another reason was the above-mentioned aim to include
journals that publish papers in different psychological areas. The temporal choice of articles was motivated by
the fact that five years should be enough to detect possible changes over time. A wider cross-sectional span could
make results difficult to interpret and would overlap with previous studies that covered articles published in the
previous century.
Coding of Articles
All downloaded articles (N = 639) were reviewed manually and the ones not relevant to the current study were
excluded. First, all articles that did not test any hypotheses were removed. These included brief reports, pilot
studies, validation studies, and reliability and factor analysis studies. Second, in order to reduce bias, only papers
with explicitly stated hypotheses were included. Hypotheses were coded if they were clearly stated, appeared
before the ’Method’ section and contained one of the following keywords – “hypothesize”, “expect”, “predict”,
“assume”, “anticipate”, “propose”, “postulate”. The articles were screened for these keywords with the search tool
if authors hadn’t differentiated the hypotheses from the introduction part. Moreover, hypotheses that were stated
as a question (e.g., ‘Is X positively associated with Z?’), contained “whether” (e.g., ‘We wanted to see whether X
predicts Z’), or were otherwise not clearly formulated were also excluded. Of all the articles that had explicitly
stated hypotheses (N = 393), 14 were excluded because it wasn’t possible to determine whether one or more
hypotheses were supported or not supported by evidence without prior knowledge in the area. Furthermore, 24
articles were excluded because all tested hypotheses were partially supported. Finally, two articles were excluded
because they did not use Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) for testing hypotheses. This left a total of
353 articles that were used in the data analysis. Table 1 shows the number of articles per year for all five journals.
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Table 1
Coded Articles per Year for All Five Journals
201120062001Journal
14613EJPE
633934EJSP
39227SJP
131211BJCP
362519BJDP
16510484Total
All papers were coded according to how many hypotheses were 1) tested, 2) supported, 3) not supported, 4)
partially supported and 5) whether at least one hypothesis was supported by evidence. Articles that reported
partially supported hypotheses (N = 97) were coded as usual, but these hypotheses were not included in the
analysis. While hypotheses in the sample were tested using NHST, not every hypothesis was tested with just one
significance test. Therefore, the number of tested research hypotheses does not necessarily correspond to the
number of significance tests that were carried out by the authors.
To calculate coding reliability, 30 randomly chosen articles were coded by an independent rater. The overall inter-
rater agreement was 75.3% for all five coded variables. Cohen’s kappa for the “at least one supported hypothesis”
variable was k = .59.
Methodological Issues
Investigating positive and negative results in psychology is intimately related to the NHST procedure, a method
for statistical inference that is widely used in psychology and other social sciences. Despite its enormous popularity,
NHST has generated a considerable amount of controversy (Nickerson, 2000) and has been criticized for its in-
correct use by researchers (e.g., see Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2004).
All articles that were analyzed in this study used NHST for statistical inference. Although alternative methods for
testing hypotheses, such as the Bayesian factor, are becoming more popular in psychology (Andrews & Baguley,
2013), NHST continues to dominate the field overwhelmingly (Cumming et al., 2007). This is further supported
by the fact that out of all eligible articles, only two did not use NHST for testing hypotheses.
Due to the controversial nature of NHST, alternative methods for data analysis, such as effect size estimation and
interval estimation, have been suggested (American Psychological Association, 2009; Kline, 2004). However,
they were not taken into account as separate methods of inference as a lot of articles were published when these
practices were not so common. Moreover, the implementation of these alternative methods has been happening
slowly and even authors that report confidence intervals rarely use them as a method of inference (Cumming et
al., 2007; Fidler, Thomason, Cumming, Finch, & Leeman, 2004).
Results
The outcome of data analysis is displayed in Table 2. The data show that 95.4% of all coded articles found support
for at least one tested hypothesis. Interestingly, the percentage of articles supporting at least one hypothesis was
95.3% in 2001 and then it dropped to 92.3% in 2006. However, this tendency did not persist into 2011, when the
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percentage of articles supporting at least one hypothesis was 97.5%. Articles that tested only one hypothesis (N
= 68) yielded a similar result – 92.6% of them found support for it.
Table 2
Number of Hypotheses Supported and not Supported by Evidence
Average number of
hypotheses not
supported by
evidence (SD)
Average number of
hypotheses
supported by
evidence (SD)
All hypotheses
supported by
evidence (%)
At least one
hypothesis supported
by evidence (%)
Number of tested
hypothesesYear of Publication
0.22 (0.49)2.05 (1.34)80.995.22112001
0.44 (0.69)2.02 (1.47)66.392.32892006
0.40 (0.77)2.41 (1.68)73.397.55092011
0.37 (0.69)2.21 (1.55)73.095.41009Total
The results also demonstrate that 73% of all articles found support for all tested hypotheses. Similarly, there was
a slight decrease in this number in 2006, but then it went up again in 2011.
Overall, the average paper supported 2.21 hypotheses and failed to support 0.37 hypotheses. This means that
the average hypothesis was 5.9 times more likely to be supported by evidence than not to. The average hypothesis
from articles in 2001, 2006 and 2011 was 9.3, 4.5 and 6 times more likely to be supported than not to be supported,
respectively.
Temporal Trends
A chi-square test showed no significant relationship between the year in which papers were published and the
number of papers that supported all tested hypotheses, χ2 (2) = 5.050, p = .080, φ = .120. The effect of the year
of publication on whether at least one hypothesis was supported was not possible to calculate because the expected
counts of 2 cells were less than 5, thus violating the assumptions of the chi-square test statistic (the minimum
expected count was 3.81).
Kruskal–Wallis tests revealed that the year in which the papers were published does not have a significant effect
on the number of hypotheses that were supported (H (2) = 5.638, p = .060) or not supported (H (2) = 5.174, p =
.075) by evidence. In other words, no statistically significant change in the number of hypotheses supported or
not supported by evidence was observed.
Even though no significant differences emerged in the time period that was studied, it is interesting to note that
from 2001 to 2011 there was a 2.4% increase in the number of studies that found support for at least one hypo-
thesis. In contrast, the percentage of papers supporting all hypotheses decreased by 9.3%. Mixed results were
also observed in the average number of tested hypotheses. The average number of supported hypotheses increased
by 17.5%, but the average number of hypotheses not supported by evidence also increased by 81.8%. In other
words, in 2011 there were 81.8% more hypotheses that failed to receive support than there were in 2001.
Discussion
The present study set out to investigate the extent to which negative results exist in five European psychology
journals. To achieve this, it measured four variables that can be used to infer this: the number of articles that
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support at least one hypothesis, the number of articles that support all tested hypotheses, and the average number
of hypotheses that are supported and not supported by evidence. Taken together, these findings demonstrate
that negative results are rare and that positive results still largely dominate all five journals. Because articles were
not coded in terms of separate null hypotheses, it is difficult to make straightforward comparisons with previous
studies. Nevertheless, the present study obtained results that are very similar to those reported by Spence and
Blanchard (2001) in that 95.4% of all articles found support for at least one tested hypothesis.
The strength of the current study is that it provides more information that can be used to estimate the prevalence
of negative results in European psychology journals. It shows that even articles that tested one hypothesis found
support for it in almost all cases. Also, the majority (73%) of published papers supported all tested hypotheses.
Moreover, the average hypothesis was almost six times more likely to be supported than not to. This suggests
that studies testing multiple hypotheses may be less likely to be published if the majority of research hypotheses
are not supported by evidence. Even though no expected percentage of negative results exists, the fact that only
4.6% of all articles failed to find support for any of the tested hypotheses suggests that studies reporting entirely
negative results may be difficult to publish.
While the present data cannot give an explanation as to why this happens, it could be speculated that some authors
who obtain negative results may conduct other studies, perhaps with significant results, in order to increase the
publication “value” of their paper. Another possibility is that authors may report only what “worked” and leave out
negative findings that may make the paper more difficult to publish. The latter argument is in line with the results
from John et al.‘s (2012) survey, which found that a fair number of psychologists admitted that they have not always
reported all conditions or dependent variables.
The statistical analyses that were carried out revealed that the year of publication did not have a significant effect
on the variables of interest. In other words, the number of positive findings has not changed significantly over the
time period that was studied. This conclusion is further supported by the average number of supported hypotheses.
While the number of supported hypotheses increased from 2001 to 2011, the increase in the number of hypotheses
that were not supported by evidence was more than four times as much. This suggests that although the number
of articles reporting positive results remained high, more articles that reported hypotheses not supported by
evidence were published in 2011 compared to 2001.
These results seem to contradict a recent survey by Fanelli (2012), who reported that negative results are disap-
pearing from most sciences. According to Fanelli (2012), articles that report full or partial support for hypotheses
have increased by more than 20% across multiple disciplines from 1990 to 2007 and the trend is “significantly
stronger in the social sciences (p. 895).” This difference may be due to the fact that that the present study was
concentrated on cross-sectional data that covers two 5-year periods. Also, Fanelli (2012) coded hypotheses that
received both full and partial support, whereas the present study did not take into account partially supported hy-
potheses.
The results of the present study, however, are in line with Spence and Blanchard’s (2001) study, which also did
not find any clear temporal change in the percentage of positive results. Moreover, Pautasso (2010) reviewed
abstracts of published papers but also failed to find evidence that positive results in psychology are increasing.
This could suggest that positive results may fluctuate slightly from year to year, but that they do not change signi-
ficantly. In this sense, although the data from the present study shows that positive findings are high in all five
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journals, there is no evidence to suggest that they have increased (or decreased) significantly over the last 10
years.
Limitations of the Study
The present study, of course, is not without its limitations and the results should be considered in the light of its
shortcomings. First, the collected data is not representative for all European psychology journals. Therefore, no
attempts are made to generalize the findings to all European psychology journals. Second, inter-rater agreement
was only marginally substantial (Landis & Koch, 1977). However, this calculation was based on only 8% of all
articles and inter-rater agreement could be different if all papers were independently coded. Furthermore, all
variables are interdependent and coding one variable differently results in differences in most others variables,
thus making nearly perfect agreement impossible to achieve.
The results of the study may also be potentially influenced by the articles published in the chosen journals or the
editorial policies at that time. For example, some articles may be unique in their research hypotheses or studied
populations. Also, journal turnover rate of editors and reviewers could be an influence because it is not known
whether or howmany of them had stayed with the journals for the whole time period. Finally, the empirical evidence
presented here cannot be used to give an explanation why this bias against negative results exists.
The Importance of Negative Results in Psychological Research
The present article has tried to argue that the low number of negative results indirectly encourages questionable
research practices and can have a detrimental effect on systematic reviews, meta-analyses, and replications in
psychology. Even though publishing more negative results will not eradicate all the problems associated with
these areas, it can nonetheless do a lot to ameliorate them.
It is difficult to draw any causal relationships between negative results, questionable research practices and doing
replications, but it is logical to assume that an increase in the proportion of negative findings in the literature will
also reduce the incentives that researchers have to engage in questionable research practices. This is likely to
happen because the difficulty of publishing papers with negative results is what tempts researchers to resort to
them in the first place. Moreover, such an increase in the published studies that report negative results will also
help design better systematic reviews and meta-analyses that will account for data that is not otherwise accessible.
Finally, publishing more studies with negative results will also stimulate researchers to conduct more replications,
not fearing that failed attempts will not get published.
The long-term benefits of publishing more negative findings are hard to ignore, but the shift towards this change
is more difficult. Some attempts have already been made to stimulate the replicability of psychological research
and to make negative results more easily accessible. For example, the PsychDrawer depository (http://www.psych-
filedrawer.org/) and the Journal of Articles in Support of the Null Hypothesis both aim to make replications and
studies with negative results publicly available. The viability of these research outlets, however, is questionable
in the long term as few researchers to date have uploaded their unpublished manuscripts to PsychDrawer and a
journal publishing entirely negative findings is bound to face different obstacles. Nevertheless, they carry the im-
portant message that the lack of negative results in the literature is a problem that hinders scientific progress and
that it should be addressed in a more substantial manner by psychologists.
Another intuitive but more difficult to implement solution would be to change editorial practices of peer-reviewed
journals that lead to this problem. If journal editors put more emphasis on the contribution of a given study instead
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of whether most (or all) significance tests yielded positive results, the problems associated with excessive positive
findings are likely to be reduced. More negative findings in the research literature will not only benefit systematic
reviews and meta-analyses, but they will also show if previous findings hold up; in the case that they don’t, this
will help identify areas that require more attention from researchers.
In fairness to journal editors, it should be noted that authors may also contribute to the problem. For example,
they may be more reluctant to submit a manuscript for publication if it reports negative results (Coursol & Wagner,
1986; Møller & Jennions, 2001). One reason why this could happen is that the increasingly competitive world of
academia puts pressure on researchers to come up with positive findings (Fanelli, 2010). For this reason, research-
ers who obtain negative results may not generally consider it worthwhile to pursue their publication, perhaps
fearing that they will waste precious time and resources.
It could be further argued that some researchers who do submit their negative studies for publication may not
make much effort to explain why their negative results are important and how they fit in the scientific body of
knowledge. Ultimately, it is the author’s job to explain in a comprehensive way why their findings are important
and to place them in the context of past and future research; likewise, it is the editor’s and reviewers’ job to eval-
uate the contribution of each article to existing knowledge. If authors reporting negative results are not motivated
to make a strong case for their paper, then perhaps reviewers and editors may not be entirely responsible for
preferring positive studies that may explain their findings better.
In this sense, it is an oversimplification to say that journal editors are entirely responsible for the high prevalence
of positive results in the literature. However, they also hold the key to changing the current situation. Just like the
authors who submit their papers, journal editors are also researchers themselves, and as such, they should live
up to the challenges that psychology faces today (e.g., see Nosek et al., 2012; Pashler & Harris, 2012). By devel-
oping journal policies that are more accepting towards negative results, editors will also motivate researchers to
submit more negative studies. This will stimulate an environment in which editors and reviewers are less likely to
consider negative findings as inferior to positive ones, and authors are less likely to not submit them for publication.
While this change would probably happen slowly, it has great potential to benefit empirical psychology. The lack
of negative results is part of a wider context and it is not by any means the ultimate solution to all other problems.
However, publishing more papers with negative results will stimulate the replicability of research findings and the
trust that we have in their validity.
Conclusion
Bias against negative findings exists in many scientific disciplines and psychology is no exception (Fanelli, 2012).
However, as this and previous studies have demonstrated, the percentage of papers reporting negative results
in psychological research is alarmingly low. This leads to a situation in which studies are virtually excluded from
the scientific body of knowledge if the results failed to reach the “holy grail of p < .05” (Glaser, 2010, p.330). As
a consequence, there is tremendous pressure on researchers to obtain and report positive results, which could
potentially lead to dishonest research practices aimed at producing publishable results. The difficulty in publishing
negative results is also part of a wider framework, because it contributes to the problem of replicability and validity
of research findings in psychology.
While there is no easy solution to the problem, it is important to remember that scientific journals are the gatekeepers
of research output, and as such, they should strive to publish research findings that represent reality more closely.
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Reporting findings that support the tested hypotheses is indispensible to the advancement of psychology as a
science because it tells us what works. However, we must not forget that often it is just as important to know what
does not work (Nippold, 2012). Putting away studies in file drawers only because they failed to reach the conven-
tional significance level leads to a unilateral view of reality. When we cannot see the bigger picture, it is difficult
to estimate the validity of research findings, to inform practice and to translate research findings into psychological
interventions.
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